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I. Introduction
Traditional  optimal  growth  models  such  as  Phelps  (1961),  Cass (1965)  and
Koopmans  (1965)  have  demonstrated  that,  with  typical  neoclassical  production
function  and  exogenously  given  time  dlscount  factor,  the  maximization  of an
additive  utility  function  defined  on per  capita  consumption  by a
representative  agent  or family  leads  to a unique  steady  state  where  the  net
marginal  productivity  of capital  equals  the  time  discount  rate.  If two
countries  have the  same  technology  and the  same  discount  rate,  It is  expected
that  per  capita  consumption,  per  capita  capital  stock,  saving  rate  and  returns
on capital  are  all  equalized  in  steady  state.
This  well-known  convergence  theorem  of  economic  growth  has  been  faced
with  a growing  number  of challenges  In  recent  years.  Empirically,  the
convergence  theorem  cannot  explain  several  puzzling  economic  facts:  (i)  why
the  growth  rates  In  some  developing  countries  with  Confucian  culture,  like
four  East  Asian 'miracles'  of  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore  are
so  high  and the  rates  In  some  developing  countries  so low;  (ii)  why  the
relative  income  gap  between  developed  countries  and  developing  countries  is
getting  wider  rather  than  narrowing;  (MIl)  why  productivity  levels  have  not
converged;  and (iv)  why the  nations  with  Protestant  religious  establishment  In
1870  had  1979  per  caplta  income  more  than  one-third  higher  than  the  nations
with  Catholic  religion  (DeLong,  1987).  To try  to  answer  these  problems,  some
This  paper  Is  based  In  part  on the  flrst  two  chapters  of my Ph.D  thesis
subwltted  to  Harvard  University  In  May 1989.  I  am grateful  to  Jeffrey  Sachs,
Richard  Caves,  Dwight  Perkins,  Bela  Balassa,  Andrew  Newman,  Lawrence  Summers,
Philippe  Well,  Danyang  Xie,  Xlnsheng  Zeng  for  helpful  discussions  ana
comments.
1new theories  have  emerged.  A typical  starting  point  for  these  new theories  is
to  depart  from the  usual  assumption  of diminishing  returns  (Romer,  1986,
and  Lucas,  1988).  Romer (1986)  has snown  that,  under  increasing  returns  to
scale,  the level  of per  capita  Income  In  different  countries  need  not
converge.
We believe  that  culture  differences  among  countries,  In  addition  to
technology,  play  an important  role  In the  determination  of economic  growth,
Here  our  alternative  growth  model  is  based  on Max  Weber's  theory  of "the
spirit  of capitalism"  and  a mathematical  model  of Mordecal  Kurz (1968).  In  an
unduly  neglected  paper  of tne  economics  profession,  Kurz (1968)  deviates  from
the  conventional  wisdom  of economics  and  defines  utility  function  on both
consumption  and  capital  which  he calls  wealth  effects.  As  we will see  In
Section  II,  this  novel  definition  of preference  function  reflects  the  essence
of the  spirit  of capitalism:  the  continual  accumulation  of  wealth  for Its  own
sake,  rather  than  for  the  materlal  rewards  that  It  can  serve  to  brlng.  (We
hasten  to  add  that  Kurz's  original  model  Is  a purely  technical  one  and  he  does
not  offer  any  explanation  or Justification  for  his Inclusion  of capital  Into
the  preference.  We hope  that  our  reasoning  will  not  distort  Kurz's  original
Ideas.)
As a result  of the  presence  of so-called  wealth  effects  in the
preference  function,  the  steady  state  capital  stock  Is larger  than  the
modified  golden  rule  level,  and  the  forms  of  utility  functions  play  a crucial
role in  determining  equilibrium  consumption  and  capital.  Therefore,  countries
with the  same technology  and the  same  time  discount  rate  may  have  different
steady  state  depending  on the  difference  In  their  wealth  effects  or their
capitalist  spirit.
In  recent  contributions  to  endogenous  growth  theory,  the  technology  Is
often  assumed  to  be constant  or Increasing  returns  In  capital  Input.  To
2generate  growth,  for  all levels  of capital  stock,  the  net  marginal  product  of
capital  is  further  assumed  to be  hounded  below  by the  time  liscount  rate.  In
Sections  III  and IV,  we will  demonstrate  how  the  capitalist  spirit  can  cause
endogenous  growth  even  though  the  net  marginal  product  of capital  can  be
smaller  than  the  time  discount  rate  or can  go to zero  as capital  increases
without  bound.  Through  a specific  example,  It is  shown  that  the  stronger  the
capltalist  spirit,  the  higner  the  endogenous  growth  rate  and  the  saving  rate.
In  Section  V, we extend  the  model  to  a monetary  economy.  In  a hybrid
Sidrauski-Kurz  model,  we find  that  there  exist  multiple  balanced  growth  paths
and Inflation  can increase  the  balanced  growth  rates.
Section  VI discusses  the  empirical  relevance  of the  capitalist  spirit
lel.  By citing  work  of sociologists,  historians  and  economists,  we will
see that  the  capitalist  spirit  approach  to  economic  growth  and  development  has
been  widely  used in  many  historical  and  empirical  studies.
We conclude  this  paper  In  Section  VII  with a few  remarks.
II.  "The  Spirit  of Capitalism"  and Its  Mathematical  Representation
Here  we first  present  a  model  essentially  the  same  as in  Kurz  8'.  A
representative  agent  maximizes  a  discounted  utility  over  an infinite  time
horizon  subject  to  a  dynamic  constraint  of capital  accumulation:
Max  f  [  u(c)  +  v(k) le  Ptdt  (1)
0
s.t.
k = f(k)  - c  (2)
where  c Is  consumption,  k Is capital  stock,  and  p is  the  time  discount  rate
and  0 < p <  1.  f(k) Is  the  r.et  cutput  function  (=  gross  output  - capital
depreciation).  A dot  over  a variable  denotes  time  derivative.  The  utility
function  has  the  following  standard  properties:
3u (c) >  0,  u'  '  (c) < 0,  u'  (0)  - >  and u'  ()  ->  0;
v'  (k)  >  0, v'  '  (k)  <  0, v'  (m)  >  0;
The  net  output  function  f(k)  is typically  neoclassical:
f(G)  =  0, f'(k) >  0, f''(k) <  0, f'(0)-->  x, f'(w) ->O,  f(W)->.
so f(k) is  strictly  concave;  and  when  capital  stock  Increases  without  bound,
the  net  marginal  product  of  capital  goes to  zero  and the  net  output  increases
to infinity.
The  optimal  path  of capital  accumulation  is  described  by the  following
two  dynamic  equations:
-u '(cjc  =  v'(k) +  u'(c)( f'k) - p )  (3)
k  =  f(k) - c  (2)
_  0
Let the  steady  state  values  be  denoted  is k  and  c ,  then
v'(k )  + u'(c )(  f'(k )  -p  )  0  (4)
f(k  '  - c  =  0  (5)
Two  facts  Immediately  follow  from  these  two  equations.  First,  the  steady
state  capital  sLock  Is  higher  than  modified  golden  rule  level.  To see  this,  we
compare  the  steady  state  condition  (4)  to the  modified  golden  rule  In  Cass
(1965),
*  ~~v'Ck)
f'(k )  =p  - ,  <  p = f'(kmg)
u'  (c  )
where  kmg  denotes  the  modified  golden  rule  capital.  Since  f''(k)  <  0, v'(k)
and  u'(c!  are  positive  for  all  k and  c, k  >  kmg.  Second,  the  steady  state
capital  Is  no longer  independent  of the  preference  functions  as In  the -ss
model.  Tn fact,  even if  different  countries  have  the  same  time  discount  rate
and  technology,  the  difference  In  the  utility  functions  can  give  rise  to
diferent per capita  capltal  stock  and  per  capita  consumption  across  countries
In the  long  run.
4It the  rest  of this  section,  we are  going  to  argue  why  the Inclusion  of
capital  or wealth  Into  the  preference  reflects  "thke  spirit  of capitalism"  in
Max  Weber's  sense  and  how  some  great  economists  In  history  have  developed  the
same idea  in  their  growth  theories.
In  "The  Pro!estant  Ethic  and th,  'pirit  of  Capitalism",  Max  Weber  (1958)
defines  capitalism  as the  rational  org&ilzatlon  of formally  free labour
(p. 21).  The  essence  of the  spirit  of capitalism  Is  the  continual  accumulation
of wealth  for Its  own  sake,  rather  than  only  for the  material  rewards  that  It
can  serve  to  bring (p.4).
"At  all  periods  of history,  wherever  It  was  possible,  there  has  been
ruthless  acquisition,  bound  to  no ethical  norms  whatever".  But  only
in  a capitalist  economy,  "man  Is  dominated  by the  making  of  money,  by
acquisition  as the  ultimate  purpose  of his life.  Economic  acquisition
is  no longer  subordinated  to  man  as the  means  for the  satisfdction  of
his  material  needs.  This  reversal  of  what  we should  call  the  natural
relationship,  so irrational  from  a  naive  point  of view,  Is  evidently  a
leading  principle  of capitalism  as it Is  foreign  to all  people  not
under  capitalist  Influence"  (p.53,  Italic  added.).
Weber's  idea  Is  cl-r: capital  act  lation  In  a capitalist  economy  is
motivated  not  only  by the  maximization  of the  long-run  consumption,  but  also
by the  enjoyment  (utility)  from  enhancing  wealth  itself.  This  capitalist
spirit  approach  to long-run  growth  has  been  also taken  by Adam  Smith  (1937),
Karl  Marx (1977)  and  John  Maynard  Keynes  (1971),  among  many  others.
In  the  "Wealth  of  Nations",  Adam  Smith  (1937)  makes  the  following
description  of a capitalist  society's  saving  behavior:
"The  principle  which  prompts  to save,  Is  the  desire  of  bettering  our
condition,  a desire  which  though  generally  calm  and  dispassionate,
comes  with  us from  the  womb,  and  nceer  leaves  us tlll  we go into  the
5grave.  ...  An  augmentation  of fortune  Is the  means  by which  the
greater  part  of  men  propose  and  wish to  better  their  condition.  It  Is
the  means  of the  most  vulgar  and  the  most  obvious;  and  the  most  likely
way  of augmenting  their  fortune,  Is  to  save  and  accumulate  some  part
of  what they  acquire,  either  regularly  and  annually,  or upon  some
extraordinary  occasions.  Though  the  principle  of expence,  thereforr,
prevails  In  almost  all  men  upon  some  occaslons,  and In  some  men  upon
almost  all  occasions,  yet In  the  greater  part  of men, taking  the  whole
course  of their  life  at an average,  the  principle  of frugality  seems
not  only  to  predominate,  but  to  predominate  very  greatly."  (The  Wealth
of Nations,  pp. 324-25)
Adam  Smith  is  so occupied  by the  moral  of savings,  he declares  that
"every  prodigal  appears  to be  a public  enemy,  and  every  frugal  man  a public
benefactor."  (P.324)
Karl  Marx (1977)  also  shares  this  view  with  many  so-called  classlcal
economist:.  He regards  the  Instinctive  nature  of  accumulation  by capitalists
as an essential  part  of capitalism:
"Accumulate,  accumulate!  That  is  Moses  and  the  prophets!  'Industry
furnishes  the  material  which  saving  accumulatesl'  Therefore  save,
save,  I.e.,  reconvert  the  greatest  possible  portion  of surplus-value
into  capital!  Accumulation  for  the  sake  of accumulation,  production
for  the  sake  of production:  this  is the  formula  In  which  classical
economists  expressed  the  historical  mission  of the  bourgeoisie  in  the
period  of its  domination."  (Capital,  Vol.1,  p.742)
John  Maynard  Keynes  (1971)  develops  the  same  idea  In  his statement  of
1
the  "psychology"  of capitalist  society  . He sa_s  that
1
I  thank  Jeffrey  Sachs  for  directing  my attention  to  Keynes'  work  "The
Economic  consequences  of  the  Peace".
6"Europe  was  se organlsed  socially  and  *-^onomically  as to  secure  the
maximun  accumulation  of capital.  While  there  was  some  continuous
improvement  in  the  daily  conditions  of life  of the  mass  of the
population,  society  was  so framed  as to  throw  a  great  part  of the
Increased  lncoi.ie  Into  the  control  of the  class  least  likely  to  consume
it.  The  new rich  of the  nineteenth  century  were  not brought  up to
large  expenditureb,  and  preferred  the  power  which  investment  gave them
to the  pleasures  of immediate  consumption....  Herein  lay,  in  fact,  the
main justification  of the  capitalist  system.  If the  rich  had  spent
their  new  wealth  on their  own  enjoyments,  the  world  would  long  ago
have  found  such  a regime  Intolerable.  But like  bees they  saved  and
accumulated,  not less  to  the  advantage  of the  whole  community  because
they  themselves  held  narrow  ends in  prospect."  (The  Economic
Consequences  of the  Peace,  p.11,  Italic  added)
Keynes  continues  to  describe  the  saving  behavior  of the  capitalist
class:
They "were  allowed  to call  the  best  part  of the  cake  theirs  and  were
theoretically  free to  consume  It,  on the  tacit  underlying  condition
that  they  consumed  very  little  of it  In  practice.  The  duty  of 'saving'
became  nine-tenths  of virtue  and the  growth  of the  cake  the  object  of
true religion. ...  And so the cake increased;  but to what end was not
clearly  contemplated.  Individuals  would  be exhorted  not so  much to
abstain  as to defer,  and to  cultivate  the  pleasures  of security  and
anticipation.  Saving  was  for  old  age  or for  your  children;  but this
was  only In  theory  ---  the  virtue  of the  cake  was that  It  was  never  to
be consumed,  neither  by  you  nor  by your  children  after  you" (P.12,
italic  added).
7Therefore,  defining  utility  on both  cornsumption  and  capital  Is  a way to
model  the  nature  of capitalism  mathematically.  In this  respect,  for  spzace
limitation,  we add  only  one  more  excellent  quotation  from  Gustav  Cassel( 1924):
"There  Is  a formation  of capital  for  which  it Is  hardly  possible  to
assign  any  concern  about  the  future  as motive.  It  cannot  be said  of
the  leading  capitalists  who  satisfy  all their  wants  of any
consequence,  and  have  a capital  the  returns  on which  guarantees  this
satisfaction  of wants  for  all  time  to them  and their  families,  yet
constantly  set  aside  large  sum to In-_rease  their  wealth,  that  they
save  out  of the  concern  about  the  future.  in these  cases  there  must  be
some  other  motive.  It Is  the  economic  Interest  of the  capitalist  to
increase  his  wealth,  and  this  in time  becomes  an end  In Itself.  The
motives  that  are  at work  are  numerous.  Ihe  senseless  cupidity  that  in
times  finds  its  sole  pleasure  In  contemplating  the  growth  of its
wealth,  and  may  very  well  be  described  as an  abnormal  sluggishness  of
spirit  and  a pathological  impoverishment  of the  emotional  life,  is
certainly  not  the  sole  explanation.  The  desire  of splendor  and  ci the
higher  position  In  the  society  which  the  possession  of great  wealth
assures,  the  stimulation  of jealousy  of other  men,  the  healthy  joy  of
the  strong  man in  successful  work  as such,  in  ruling  large  masses,  in
influence  especially  ---  these  are  all  factors  that  have  to  be taken
into  account."  (  The  theory  of  Social  Economy,  pp.228-29.)
To define  utility  function  on both  consumption  and  capital  or  wealth  Is
also  a way to  model  man  no  only  as an economic  animal,  but  also  a political
animal.  Ever  since  Aristotle,  we are  taught  that  "man  Is  by nature  an  animal
of Intended  to live  In  a polls".  (see  Aristotle,  1958).  Wealth  or property
provides  man  not  only  consumptlon  means  but  also  political  power  and  social
8prestige.  Possession  of  wealth  Is,  to  a considerable  degree,  a measure  and
standard  of a person's  success  In  a society.  Thus  capital  and  wealth  directly
enter  to the  utility  function  of the  representative  agent  of the  capitalist
economy.  ,n  a recent  book  on  power,  Galbraith  (1984),  following  the  long
traciltion  of sociology  and  political  science,  classifies  wealth  as one  of
three  resources  of political  power.  "In  past 'ime,  so  great  was the  prestige
of property that ...  it  accorded power to Its  possessor. What the mar  r
wealth  said  or believed  attracted  the  belief  of others  as  a matter  of course."
(p4 9) To this  day, "wealth  per  se  no longer  gives  automatic  access  to
conditional  power.  The  rich  man  who  now  seeks  such influence  hires  a public
relations  firm  to  win  others  to  his  beliefs.  Or he contributes  to  a politician
or a political  action  committee  that  reflects  his  views.  Or he goes Into
polUtics  himself  and  uses  his  property  not  to  purchase  votes  but to  persuade
voters."(p.50)
This  analysis  agrees  with  what  Lord  Acton's  (1988)  contention  that:"
Power  goes  wlth  property"  (P.572).  In  a laisser-faire  capitalist  et .iomy,
"fLeedom  of accumulation  not  only  carries  with It the  possibility  of
cumulative  Increase  In the  inequallty  of economlc  power,...  In  additlon,
economic  power  confers  power  In  other  forms,  including  the  political."  (Frank
Knight,  1942,  P.82).  Seeking  high  social  position  and  power  has  been  long
recognized  as one  of the  most Important  motivation  In  capital  accumulation.  In
the  discussion  related  to the  spirit  of capitalism,  Max  Weber (1958)
explicitly  states  that  "the  desire  for  the  power  and  recognition  whilch  the
mere  fact  of wealth  brings  plays  Its  part"  (P.70)  In  capital  accumulation.
So much is  the  Justifications  why  we should  define  a representative
agent's  utility  function  on both  consumptlon  and  capital  (or  wealth).  We turn
next  to the  relation  between  the  capltalist  spirit  and  endogenous  growth.
9III.  "The  Spirit  of  Capitalism"  and  Endogenous  Growth
Recent  contributions  to  endogenous  growth  theory  have  shown  that
long-run  growth  rate  can  be  endogenously  determined  by preference  and
technology.  A common  starting  point  of many  models  Is to  assume  that  the
prod  ction  technology  's  Increasin_  or constant  returns  to  scale  instead  of
diminishing  returns:  e.g.,  Romer (1986),  Lucas  (1988),  Barro  (1990)  and  Rebelo
(1991!.  In  a convex  model  of  endogenous  growth,  while  allowing  decreasing
returns  to scale,  Jones  and  Manuelli  (1990)  assume  that  the  net  marginal
product  of capital  does  not  go to  zero  as the  stock  of capital  Increases
without  bound.  In  fact,  In  all  these  models,  in  order  to  generate  endogenous
growth,  it  Is required  that  the  net  marginal  product  of capital  Is  always
greater  than  the  time  discount  rate.  This  Is the  so-called  lower  boundary
condition  on technology.
We are  going  to  show  that  the  Inclusion  of the  capitalist  spirit  into
the  model  can  generate  endogenous  growth  without  this l^war  boundary
condition.  In  this  section  we will  retain  all  the  assumptions  regarding  the
utility  functions  in  the  last  section.  In  the  following,  unless  otherwise
noted,  the  net  production  function  Is  strictly  concave  and,  when  capital  stock
Increases  to Infinity,  the  net  output  also  Increases  to Infinity,  but the  net
margir-al  product  of  capital  can  be less  than  the  time  discount  rate,  p:
f''(k) <  0, and f(w)->  w,  and f'(w) <  p.
From  the last  section,  the  optimal  conditions  regarding  the  time
path  of consumption  and  capital  accumulation  can  also  be written  as:
c =  {v'(k)/u'(c)  +  (  f'(k)  - p Dam(c)  (6)
k =  i(k)  - c  (2)
where  mr(c)  Is  the  coefficient  of  the  absolute  risk  aversion:
o(c)  =  - u" (c)/u'  (c).
10It Is Immediate  from (6)  that,  if there  is  no capitalist  spirit  and  v(k)
and  v'(k)  are  zero,  we  go back  to the  standard  Cass  model:  in the  long  run,  as
the  net  marginal  product  of capital  is  less  than  the  time  discount  rate,  p,
consumption  growth  will  stop  when  the  net  marginal  product  equals  the  time
discount  rate,  i.e.,  f'(k)  =  p. All  the  new  endogenous  growth  models  have
tried  to "escape"  from  this  rule  by modifying  the  technology  such  that  the  net
marginal  product  of capital  is  always  larger  than  the  time  discount  rate (the
lower  boundary  condition).  With  this  lower  boundary  condition,  capital  and
consumption  will  grow  for  ever.
Due to the  existence  of capitalist  spirit  In  our  model,  the  lower
boundary  condition  Is  not  necessary  for  unbounded  growth  of capital  and
consumption:
ProposItlon  1:  Suppose  that  f'(k)  +  v'(k)/u'(f(k))  is  larger  than  the
time  discount  rate  p and  k  is  any  value  satisfying  the  inequality:
f'(k) < p. Then  consumption  and  capital  will  rise  for  ever.
Proof:  In  equation  (6),  if  f'(k)  a  p, the  right  hand  side  will  be positive  and
consumption  will  rise:  c >  0. If '  (k)  <  p,  and  suppose  that  there  exists  a
steady state, then, from k  =  0, f(k)  =  c,  and from c =  0,
v'(k)/u'(f(k)) + [f'(k)  - p] =  0  (7)
But  equation  (7)  cannot  hold  because  by assumption,  f'(k)  + v'(k)/u'(f(k))  > p
for  any  k  satisfying  f'  (K)  <  p.  So  c cannot  be zero.  The  case that  c is
negative  can  be ruled  out.  This Is  because  a negative  c  can  happen  only If  c <
f(k)  for  any  value  of k that  Is  higher  than  modified  golden  rule  level.  In
this  case,  [v'(k)/u'(c)]  is  less  than  [v'(k)/u'(f(k))I  for  u'(c)  >  u'(f(k)).
But  then,  k in (2)  will  be  positive  for  f(k)  > c and  capital  will increase  to
infinity  at the  same  time  when  consumption  keep  decreasing.  Sooner  or later,
the  marginal  utility  of consumption  will  be significantly  higher  than  the
11marginal  utility  of capital  (for  v'(O)  ->  0) and  the  representative  agent's
utility  can  be raised  by reversing  this  process.  Therefore,  the  only  optimal
path Is  to  have  consumption  Increase  for  ever:  c > 0. But  without  an ever
Increasing  capital  stock,  this  ever  growing  consumption  Is  not  sustainable,  so
k >  0 always. QED.
Proposition  1 Implies  that,  to  have  unbounded  growth,  It Is  essential
to require  that,  as both  consumption  and  capital  Increase  to Infinity,  the  sum
of the  net  marginal  productivity  of capital  and  the  marginal  rate  of
substitution  between  capital  and  consumptlon  Is larger  than  the  time  discount
factor.  In  particular,  if the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  capital
and consumption,  v'(k)/u'(f(k)),  is larger  than  the  time  discount  rate  for  all
k such  that  f'(k)  < p,  consumption  and  capital  will  keep  growing  even  though
the  net  marginal  product  of capital  can  go to zero  when  capital  increases
without  bound.
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Figure  1:  P is  the  optimal  path
In  figure  1,  both  curves  are  upward  slopping  because  the  slope  for  k =  0 and  c
=  0 are positive and are given by [v"(k')  +  u'(c')f"(k')]/u"(c')[p - f'(k')l
and  f'(k''),  respectively.  Here  c' and  k' denote  the  values  of consumption  and
capital  satisfying  the  equation  c =  0,  and  c" and  k" denote  the  value  for  k -
0.  Given  the  condition  in  Proposition  1, there  Is  no Intersection  (i.e.,  no
steady  state)  for these  two  curves.  Since  both  consumption  and  capital  are
12Increasing,  the  optimal  path,  P, is  bounded  in  the  region  between  k = 0  and  c
0. Below  the  curve  k =  0, c  Is  smaller  than  f(k)  and  k Is  positive;  above
the  curve  c =  0, for  given  k',  c Is larger  than  the  value  of consumption,  c',
which  satisfies  that  c = 0, so c  will  be positive  as u'(c)  is  deceasing  In  c,
c >  c', and v'(k')/u'(c) is larger than v'(k')/u'(c').
IV.  Two  Examples
We first  present  an example  by assuming  that  the  net  output  is  constant
returns  to  capital  as in  Barro  (1990)  and  Rebelo  (1991):
f(k) = Ak  (7)
Just  for  simplicity,  we let  the  utility  functions  be:
u(c)  logc,  v(k)  = jllogk
here the  parameter  l  is  positive  and it  measures  the  capitalist  spirit.
To generate  endogenous  growth  In  the  Barro-Rebelo  model,  it is  essential
to  have the  net  marginal  product  of capital  be greater  than  the  time  discount
rate:  A > p. This  condition  can  be easily  relaxed  in  our  capitalist  spirit
model.  In  fact,  let  A <  p and so  f'(k)  (=  A) < p. Furthermore,  for  u(c)  = logc
and v(k) = Slogk, v'(k)/u'(f(k)) = 1lA.  If  RA >  p though A <  p, by Proposition
1, there  will  be endogenous  growth.  But  since  f'(k)  equals  to  A (A  > 0) for
all  k, we have:
Proposition  2: Let  f(k)  = Ak  and  A <  p. there  will  be endogenous  growth
if (1  +  J)A is larger  than  the  time  discount  rate  p;  and the  balanced
growth  rate,  denoted  as y,  is given  by:
I  = A - p/(l +  13).
Proof:  The  current  value  Hamiltonian  is:
H = logc  +  1llogk  +  A (Ak  - c)
13here  A  Is  the  costate  variable.  The  optimal  conditions  are:
=1  (8)
(g/kA) +  A - p =  - A/A  (9)
(A - I/kA) =  k/k  (10)
Differentiate  condition  (8)  with respect  to time and  denote  the  constant
growth rate of consumption as 1,
- A/A =  c/c
Substitute I  into  (9):
kA = V(z  + p - A)  (11)
Differentiate  (11)  with  respect  to  time  on both  sides,
k/k =  - A/A =
That is to  say, the  growth  rate  of capital  on the  balanced  growth  path Is the
same as the growth rate of consumptlon.  Substitute k/k =  i  into  (10):
kA =  (A  - 7) -I  (12)
Then  use (11)  and (12)  to  solve  for  the  balanced  growth  rate  7,
,3/(T  +  p - A) =  (A - 7)  1
and
e  =  A - p/(1  +  0)  (13)
To have  positive  growth  rate  In (13),  A - p/(l  + g)  needs  to be  positive,
namely,  (1  + J)A > p. From  equation  (13),  the  growth  rate  Is  higher  if the
spirit  of capitalism  Is  stronger:
dT/djl  =  p/(l +  1)2 >  0.
Even If  technology  and the  time  discount  rate  are  the  same  across  countries,
the  growth  rates  will  be different  If the  capitalist  spirit  is  different.
On the  balanced  growth  path,  the  saving  rate,  s, Is
s =  k/f(k) =  (k/k)(k/Ak)  =  7/A  =  1 - p/(l+i)A  (14)
So the  saving  rate  is  an Increasing  function  of the  capitalist  spirit:
ds/dir  =  p/A(1+1) 2 >  O.
14As a second  example,  we let:
f(k) =  k  and 0 <  a  <  1  (15)
so f'(k)  ->  0 as k ->  m. Let u(c) =  logc  and v(k) =  1lk  , then, If  Oa >  p,
c and  k  will  be positive  all  the  time.  To see  this,  we only  need  to check  that
the  condition  in  Proposition  1 Is  satisfied:
v'(k)/u'(f(k)) =  Oak  k  Oa
Thus there  exists  no steady  state  if  ga > p, and  consumption  and  capital  stock
will  keep  rising.
V. Inflation  and Endogenous Growth
The  capitalist  splrit  model  provides  a  convenlent  framework  to  study
money  and  growth.  While  the  general  analysis  of a  hybrid  Kurz-Sidrauski  model
can  be done,  for  tractability  and  simplicity,  we  will  mainly  rely  on some
specific  functions  to  see  how inflation  affects  the  endogenous  growth  rate.
Again  let  the  technology  be the  same  as in  Barro-Rebelo  model:
f(k)  =  Ak.
With  money,  the  wealth  accumulation  equation  becomes:
a  =  f(k)  +  x - c  - nm =  Ak  +  x - c  - rm
a  =  k  +  m.
where  m stands  for  the  real  balances,  a  for  wea.th,  x  for  the  government
transfer,  and  n is  the  expected  inflation  rate.
We assume  that  the  representative  agent  maximizes  the  following
discounted  utility  with  "the  spirit  of  capitalism"  separable  from  the  typical
utility  function  In  the  Sidrauski  model:
max  J[u(c,m)  + Rloga]e t dt
0
isTo  explicitly  calculate  the  endogenous  rate  of growth,  we let:
u(c,m)  = logc  + logm.
The  optimal  conditions  are (A  Is  the  costate  variable):
A =  c 1 (16)
A(A +  n)  =  m 1 (17)
$(k+m)  +  A(A - p)  =  - A  (18)
Ak +  x  - c - lm =  k + m  (19)
By definition,
m =  (E  - p/p)m  (20)
here  9 is  the  money  growth  rate  and  p is  the  price  level.  On the  perfect
foresight  path,  the  expected  inflation  rate  equals  the  actual  one:
f  =  p/p  (21)
In  addition,  the  government  transfer,  x, is just  the  revenue  from Inflation:
x =  em  (22)
Substituting  (20),  (21)  and (22)  into  (17),  (18)  and (19),  we obtain:
A  =c  (16)
m/c  = (A  + O -m/m) 1 (23)
(m  + k)/c  =  (p - A  -A/A)  (24)
k =  Ak - c  (25)
In the  rest  of this  section,  we focus  on a particular  solution  to the
dynamic  system:  the  balanced  growth  path.  Along  this  path,  all  real  variables
grow at a constant rate. Let y  be the growth rate of consumption, 7 =  c/c =
A/A.  Differentiate  (23)  on  both  sides  with  respect  to time  and  note  that  m/m
Is  a constant:
mn/m  =  c/c  = 
Similarly  from (25),
k/k =  c/c  =
Therefore,  on the  balanced  growth  path,  consumption,  real  balances  and  capital
16all growth at the same rate, 1.
Next  we  want to  solve  the  balanced  growth  rate,  1,  In  terms  of
technology,  preference  parameters  and  money  growth  rate.  In (23),  (24)  and
(25),  substitute  all  the  growth  rates  with  the  common  variable  A:
m./c  =  (A +  0 - )1  (26)
k/c =  (A  - 7)1  (27)
(m  +  k)/c =  [(p  - (A  - 7)l  (28)
As (26)  plus (27)  equals  (28):
(A +  6  - 7)  + (A  - ')  =  3p  - (A - 7)]
Simple  algebra  leads  to
- [(3+1)0  -2p] _ 4[(0+1)e  _ 2p]2  +  4(2+g)0p
A  v  2(2  +  R)
Therefore  we have two  possible  balanced  growth  rates:
[(fr+1)e  -2p]  - 4[(1+1)e  - 2p] 2 +  4(2+0)Op
. =  A +  2(2+  29)
2  (2  +~~~~
ECP+I)e  -2p]  + 4f1C+1)e  - 2p]2  +  4(2+g)Op
2_ = A +  2(2+  )  (30)
In  passiag  we note  that,  If the  capitalist  spirit  is  not  present  In  the
model,  In  other  words,  if  13 = 0, the  utility  function  Is (logc  + logm)  and
the  unique  balanced  growth  rate  Is  directly  given  by equations  (16)  and (18):
7 = A - p
which  is  exactly  the  same  as the  case  of the  real  economy  and  Is Independent
of Inflation.  In  this  case,  to  guarantee  positive  growth,  the  net  marginal
product  of capltal  has to  be larger  than  the  time  discount  rate (the  lower
boundary  condition).  By the  way,  we cannot  set  1  =  0 In (29)  and (30)  to  get
the  balanced  growth  rate  because  (29)  and (30)  are  derived  with  the  assumption
17that 0  >  0.
In (29)  and (30),  we can  show:
Proposition  3:  The  higher  the  inflation  rate,  the  higher  the  balanced
growth  rates.
Proof:  Differentiate  w  and  72  with  respec.  to 9 In (29)  and (30):
d  - 1  ((+1)0-2p](a+1)  +  2(2+13)p
=  {(fr.)  - (31)
dO  2(2+3)  2
V  [((+1)0-2pJ  + 4(2+1l)Op
d72  1  [(1+1)0-2pJ(13+1)  +  2(2+3)p
_=  {(+1)  +  ,  (32)
dO  2(2+3)  2
V  t($+1)6-2p]  + 4(2+i)Op
In  the  appendix,  it is  shown  that  the  right  hand  side  of (31)  Is  positive
and 8a  /aO  >  0. As the  right  hand  side  of (32)  Is larger  than  the  one  in (31),
072/8e  >  0 as  well. The possible reason for this result might be  the
following:  with  higher  rate  of money  supply  and  higher  Inflation,  the
representative  agent  tends  to substitute  real  balance  holdings  with  capital.
That  will stimulate  the  rate  of Investment  and  capital  accumulation,  which  In
turn  raises  the  balanced  growth  rate  in  the  economy.  In  the  end,  as the
balanced  growth  rate  goes  up,  the  rise  in  the  rate  of money  growth  does  not
bring  about  a full  proportional  rise In  Inflation  rate.  To see  this,  Just  look
at the  following  Identity:
m/m  =  -n
On the  balanced  growth  paths,
7  =  e  - n,  i = I  and 2.
Differentiate  this  equation  with respect  to the  rate  of money  growth:
die  d7
- =  1  - - <1
dO  dO
Therefore,  Inflation  falls  short  of the  money  growth  rate.
18Proposition  3 Is  a very  strong  result.  In  the  Sidrauski  model,  It Is
well  known  that  lnflation  does  not  affect  long-run  capital  accumulation
(superneutrality  of money).  When the  purchase  of both  consumption  and
Investment  goods  are  subject  to the  cash-in-advance  constraint,  Stockman
(1982)  has  shown  a negatlve  association  between  inflation  and  capital
accumulation.  Our  capitalist  spirit  model  supports  the  result  derived  from  the
ad  hoc  Tobin (1965)  model.
Proposition  4:  The  stronger  the  capitalist  spirit,  the  higher  the
balanced  growth  rates.
Proof:  In  equations  (29)  and (30),  differentiate  7  and  y2  with respect  to
5, and rearrange terms,
1  2
- =  - - {(0+2p)  +  V  E(C+1)0-2p]  +4(2+8)op -
da3  2 (2+i3)2
(2+0)(1l+1)2
(33)
V  [(9+1)0-2p] 2 +4( 2 +f3 )op




V  [(9+1)0-2p]2  4(2+1l)Op
Again  (33)  and (34)  are  shown  to  be positive  In the  appendix.  Thus  the
positive  association  between  the  spirit  of capitalism  and  economic  growth
holds  in  both  real  economy  and  monetary  economy.
19VI.  The  Empirical  Relevance  of the  Capitalist  Spirit  Model
It Is  interesting  to  observe  tha'  we economists  tend  to  explain  growth
and  development  by dealing  with  capital,  labor  and technology,  while
historians,  political  scientists  and  sociologists  pay  much  more  attention  to
the  cultural  and  other  institutional  background  of growth  and  development.
That  might  be the  division  of labor  among  intellectuals.  Our  model  is  an
attempt  to  reconcile  in  part  both  stories  told  by  economists  and  other  social
scientists.
Since  Max  Weber  published  his  famous  study,  "The  Protestant  Ethic  and
the  Spirit  of Capitalism",  there  has  been tremendous  accumulation  of
literature  on capitalist  spirit  and Its  relation  to religions  and  wealth
creation.  Though  sociologists  and  historian  (M.  Weber,  W. Sombart,  1915,  R. H.
Tawney,  1926)  often  argue  more  about  which  religious  belief  leads  to
capitalist  spirit,  the  positive  link  between  capitalist  spirit  and  wealth
accumulation  has  been taken  for  granted.  Recently  there  are  even  studies  to
provide  theological  Justifications  for  the  capitalist  spirit.  For Interested
readers,  a good  collection  is  Peter  Berger's  (1990)  "The  Capitalist  Spirit:
Toward  a Religious  Ethic  of Wealth  Creation".
Empirically,  recent  examples  of capitalist  spirit  approach  to  growth  and
development  are  numerous.  To cite  a few,  there  are  Harilson's  (1985)  study:
Underdevelopment  is  a State  of Mind,  Wiener's  (1981)  work on the  decline  of
British  Industries:  English  Culture  and  the  Decline  of the  Industrial  Spirit:
1850  - 1980,  and  MacFarquhar's  (1985)  study  on the  four  Asian 'miracles'  of
South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore:  The  Post-Confucian  Challenge.
Our  economics  profession  Is  not immune  from  this  capitalist  spirit
approach.  I  quote  two  studies  here.  The  first  one Is  DeLong  (1988).  Contrary
to the  clalm  by William  Baumol  (1986),  DeLong  finds  that  the  productivity
levels  among  once-rich  twenty-two  countries  In 1870  did  not  converged  In 1979.
20In fact, "holding constant 1870 per capita Income,  nation that had Protestant
religious  establishments  In  1870  had 1979  per  capita  Income  more  than
one-third  higher  than  do nations  thiat  had  Catholic  estaAiishments".  And  he
shows  that  "there  Is  one  striking  ex-ante  association  between  growth  over
1870-1979  and  an  exogenous  variable:  a nation's  dominant  religious
establishment. ...  A religious establishment variable that Is  one for
Protestant,  one-half  for  mnixed,  and  zero  for  Catholic  nations  is  significantly
correlated  with  growth  as long  as measurement  error  variance  is  not  too  high".
Indeed,  "it  does  Eerve  as  an example  of  how  culture  may  be associated  with
substantial  divergence  In  growth  performance".  DeLong  is  not the  first
economist  to  put  forward  such  an argument.  Kenrneth  Boulding  (1973)  entitles
one  of his Interesting  papers  as "religious  foundations  of economic  progress",
In  which  he argues  that  Protestant  ethic  has  not  only Influenced  the
development  of capitalism,  but  "the  Protestant  ethic  has  contributed  to the
success  of  capltalist  Institutions,  particularly  In regard  to their  fostering
a high  rate  of  economic  progress."(p.45)
The  second  colorful  example  is  Morishima  (1982):  Why  Has  Japan
'Succeeded'?.  Under  this  sensational  title,  Michio  Morishima  attributes  the
economic  success  of Japan  Into  Western  technology  and  Japanese  Confucianism.
His  approach  Is typical  Weberian  and  his  comparison  between  protestant  ethic
and  Japanese  etheos  is Illuminating.  For  modern  capitalism  to be  established,
a religious  revolution  had  to come  first.  In  the  Western,  "Puritanism's
worldly  frugality  meant  opposition  to  enjoyment  and  consumption,  and  luxury
consumption  especially  was  completely  squeezed  out, In  this  way the  formation
of capital  was  carried  out  through  frugality;  new  capital  was  then  used
productively  and  became  a new  source  of  profit.  Thus the  religious  revolution
resulting  from  Protestantism  created  the  modern  entrepreneur  and  capitalism  -
a new  type  of person  who  was the  possessor  of an earnest  faith,  and  who
21controlled  huge  wealth,  but  nevertheless  contended  himself  with  a life  of
extreme  simplicity,  striving  to  accumulate  capital"  (pp  83 - 84).
"If  the  Japanese  had  not  adopted  the  belief  of frugality,  which  was
another  of the  prerequisites  of capitalJsm,  then  modern  capitalism  could
certainly  not  have  been  achieved  In  Japan.  In  Japan  in  those  days  Buddhism  and
Shinto,  the  traditional  religions,  did  not  have  that  great  Influence  on the
everyday  life  of the  Japanese  people.  However,  ...  as a result  of the  Tokugawa
Bakufu's  cultural  policy,  Confucianism  had  spread  widely  and  deeply  among  the
Japanese  people.  Confucianism  was  understood  In  Japan  as an ethical  system
rather  than  a religion,  and  it  directly  taught  the  Japanese  people  that  frugal
behavior  was  noble  behavior.  Therefore  Japan,  at the  end  of the  Meiji
Revolution,  had  already  fulfilled  the  second  prerequisite  for  capitalism"
(p.86).
Japan's  story  Is  not  exceptional.  Now  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore
and  Hong  Kong  are  following  the  Japanese  example.  As observed  by Roderlck
MacFarquhar  (1985),  for  all  these  countries,  "the  significant  coincidence  Is
culture,  the  shared  heritage  of  centuries  of Inculcation  with  Confucianism.
That Ideology  Is  as Important  to  the  rise  of the  east  Asian  hyper-growth
economies  as the  conjunction  of Protestantism  and  the  rise  of capitalism  in
the  west."  "Post-Confucian  economic  man  works  hard  and  plays  hard,  buys  much,
but  saves  more".
As another  example  to Illustrate  how  change  In  the  capitalist  spirit  may
affect  Industrial  growth,  we  quote  from  Martin  Wiener  (1982):  English
Culture and the Decline of the industrial  Spirit, 1850 - 1980:
For  Britain,  Wiener  argues  that,  after  the  Great  Exhibition  of 1851,
"social  and  psychological  currents  began  to flow  In  a different  directlon'
(plS 7). "The  emerging  culture  of industrialism  ...  was itself  transformed.  The
thrust  of  new  values  borne  along  by the  revolution  In Industry  was contained
22in  the  later  nineteenth  century;  the  social  and Intellectual  revolution
implicit  In  industrialism  was  muted,  perhaps  even  aborted"  (p157).  "For  a
century  and  a half the  Industrialist  was  an  essential  part  of English  society,
yet  he  was  never  quite  sure  of  his  place.  The  educated  public's  suspicions  of
business  and industry  inevitably  colored the  self-image  and  goals  of the
business  community.  Industrialists  responded  to their  mental  environment,
sometimes  by seeking  to leave  the  world  of  production  for  more  acceptable
realms  of gentility,  and  sometimes  by striving  to  adapt  their  way  of life  to
the  can-ns  of gentility.  ...  As  a rule,  leaders  of commerce  and Industry  in
England  over the  past  century  have  accommodated  themselves  to  an elite
culture  blended  of preindustrial  aristocratic  and  religious  values  and  more
recent  bureaucratic  values  that  Inhibited  their  quest  for  expansion,
productivity,  and  profit"  (p.127).  The  gentrification  of the  industrialists
discouraged  "commitment  to  a  wholehearted  pursuit  of economic  growth"  (P.127)
and led  to "the  waning  of the industrial  spirit"  (P.159)  or the  capitalist
spirit.
VII.  Concluding  Remarks
This  paper  has  shown  that  a  strong  capitalist  splrlt  can lead  to
unbounded  growth  of consumption  and  capital  even  though  the  net  marginal
product  of capital  Is less  than  the  tlme  discount  rate  or goes  to zero  when
capital  stock  Increases  to infinity.  In  doing  this  we have  relaxed  the
technology  condition  required  In  many  endogenous  growth  models  and  at the  same
time  integrated  two  approaches  to  economic  growth  and  development  ---  the
production  technology  approach  and the  cultural  approach  ---  Into  a single
model.
While  we have  mainly  focused  on the  role  of  capitalist  spirit  In
23generating  long-run  growth,  we want  to  emphasize  that  our  model  Is strictly
complementary  to  many  existlag  models  which  have  more  or less  concentrated  on
the  technology  and  productivity  progress.  In  fact,  as the  capitalist  spirit
model  Just  adds  a cultural  element  to the  existing  models,  It can  embody  all
the  contributions  by both  the  traditional  growth  theory  and  the  new  growth
theory.  It Is  a  mistake  to totally  ignore  the  cultural  elements  in economic
growth  and  development,  but it is  a blunder  to just  talk  about  culture  without
putting  technology  in its  right  place.  This Is  why  Morishima  (1982)  explains
the  successful  story  of Japan  by two  factors:  Western  technology  and  Japanese
Confucianism.  The  balance  between  culture  ind  technology  should  be always
maintained.
24References
Lord  Acton:  "Essays  in  Religion,  Politics,  and  morality", Edited by  J.  R.
Fears,  Liberty  Classics,  Indianapolis,  1988.
Aristotle,  The  politics  of Aristotle,  Edited  and  Translated by  E.  Barker,
Oxford  University,  1958.
Barro,  R.:"Government  Spending  in  a Simple  Model  of Endogenous  Growth",  J. P.
E. 98,  October  1990,  S103-25.
Berger,  P. (ed.):"The  Capitalist  Spirit:  Toward  a religious  Ethic  of  Wealth
Creation."  Institue  for  Conyemporary  Studies,  San  Francisco,  CA,  1990.
Boulding,  K.:"Religious  Foundations  of  Economic  Progress", In "Collected
Papers of  Kenneth Boulding". Vol.  3,  pp.43-51, Colorado Associated
University  Press,  1973.
Cass,  D.:"Optimum  Growth  In  an  Aggregate Model  of  Capital Accumulation."
Review  of  Economic  Studies  32 July  1965,  PP.229-43.
Cassel,  G.:  "The  Theory  of  Social  Economy",  Harcourt,  Brace  and  Company,  1924.
DeLong,  B.:"Productivity  Growth,  Convergence,  and  Welfare:  Comment."  A.E.R.,
December  1988.
Galbraith,  J. K.:The  Anatomy  of  Power,  Houghton  Mifflin  Company  Boston,  1983.
Harrison,  L.  :"Underdevelcpment  Is  a State  of  Mind  ---  The  Latin  American
Case",  Harvard  University  and  University  Press  of America,  1985.
Jones,  L. and  Manuelli,  R.:"A  Convex  Model  of Equilibrium  Growth:  Theory  and
Policy  Implications."  J.P.E.  98,  October,  1990,  pp.1008-38.
Keynes,  J.  M.:"The  Economic  Consequences  of the  Peace",  Macmillan,  ST Martin's
Press,  1971.
Knight,  F. H.:  "Freedom  and  Liberty",  Liberty  Press,  Indianapolis,  1947,  1982.
Koopmans,  T. C.:"  On  the  Concept of  Optimal Economic Growth", In  The
Econometric  Approach  to  Development  Planning.  Amsterdam:  North-Holland,
1965.
25Kurz, M.:"Optimal  Economic  Growth  and  Wealth  Effects",  International
Economic Review, Vol.9, Oct. 1968,  pp.348-57.
Lucas, R. E.:"On  the  Mechanics  of  Economic  Development",  Journal  of
Monetary  Economics,  1988,  pp.  3-42.
MacFarquhar,  R.:"The  Post-Confucian  Challenge",  In  Korea:  Past,  Present and
Future,Queenstown,  MD:  Aspen  Institute  for  Humanistic  Studies,  1985.
Marx,  K.:"Capital",  Volume  One,  Vintage  Books  Edltion,  1977.
Mill,  J.  S.  :"Principles  of Political  Economy",  Edited  by W. J. Ashley,
Longmans,  Green,  and  Co., 1909.
Morishima,  M.:"Why  Has  Japan  'Succeeded'?",  Cambridge  University  Press,  1982.
Phelps,  E.  S.:"The  Golden  Rule  of Accumulation:  A  Fable for  Growth  men
A.E.R.,  Vol.  51,  1961,  pp.  638-43.
Ramsey,  F.:"A  Mathematical  Theory  of Saving",  Economic  Journal,  38,  December
1928,  pp. 543-59.
Rebelo,  S.:"Long  Run  Policy  Analysis  and  Long Run  Growth",  J.P.E.,
forthcoming,  1991.
Romer,  P.:"Increasing  Returns  and  Long-run  Growth  ",  J.P.E.  Vol.94,  1986,
pp. 1002-1037.
Sombart,  W.:"The  Jews  and  Modern  Capitalism".
---:"The  Quintessence  of Capitalism",  Translated  and  Edited by  M.  Epstein,
1915.
Tawney,  R. H.:"Religion  and the  Rise  of  Capitalism", 1926, Penglun Books,
1961.
Tobin,  J.:"Money  and  Economic  Growth,"  Econometrica  33,  1965,  pp.671-84.
Weber,  M.:The Protestant Ethic  and  The  Spirit of  Capitalism,  Charles
Scribner's  Sons,  New  York,  1958.
Wiener,  M.:  "English  Culture  and  the  Decline  of  the  Industrial  Spirit,  1850 -
1980",  Cambridge  University  Press,  1981.
26Appendix
Here  we prove  Propositions  three  and  four.
For  proposition  three,  we only  need to  show  that  the  terms  In  the
parentheses  of  equation  (31)  is  positive.  Suppose  not, then:
[C(9+1)0 - 2 p](g+1)  +  2(2+g)p
+  1) <  (Al)
V  [(0+1)O-2p] 2 +  4(2+9)6p
For  8 >  0, the  numerator  on the  right  hand  side  of (Al)  ls  positive,  so  both
sides  are  positive.  Take  square  on  both  sides,  and  cross  multiply:
(9+1)  2{ [(3+1)e-2p  2+4(2+0)op  I  <  {  [(($+l)-2p](l+l)+2(2+1)p  2  ()
Expand  the  expression:
($+1)  [(R+l)O-2pI2+(+1)2  (2+9) 4 0p  <  (+1)2  [((+l)Q-2p]  2+(+l) 2(2+13)40p  -
Sp 2(j+0(2+1)  +  4p2(2+1)  (A3)
Namely,
O <  - 8p2(1+1)(2+1l)  +  4p2 (2+3)2  (A4)
or
O  < 4p  2(2+9)(2+1-243-2)  (AS)
O <  - 4p 2(2+g)  (A6)
Inequality  (A6)  Is  a contradiction  for  both  1  and  p  are  positive, and  the
right  hand  side Is  negative.  Hence  the  right  hand  side  of  equation  (31) is
positive.
Next  we show  that  the  terms  In  the  parentheses  of  equation  (33)  Is
positive,  which  Is  the  same  as:
(2+)  (3+1)i  2
(0+2p)  +  V  [(Cl+1)0-2p]  2+4(2+9)Op  >  (A7)
V[((+1)e-2p)  2+4(2+i3)ep
27Multiply  both  sides  by  the  positive number V/[(+1)9-2p  2+4(2+1)ep,  and
simplify:
(6+2p)V1((+1)0-2p]  2+4(2+1)ep  +  4p2  +  46p >  (g  +  1)02  (AS)
But  the  left  hand  side  of Inequality  (AS)  is the  same  as:
2  2  22  2 (C+2p)v/  (0+1) 2 2+4p 2+40p  + 4p  + 40p  >  (0+2p)(1.+1)9  +  4p  +  46p  >
>  (i  +  1)o2  (A9)
which Is  Just  what  we need  to  prove.
To show  that (34)  Is  positive,  we need:
2  - (2+1)  (4+)02
V  [((l+1)-2pJ  +4(2+l)ep  <  +  (0+2p)  (AIO)
V[(0+1)09-2p  2+4(2+i)Gp
or:
[((+1)e-2p]2+4(2+  )9p  < (2+9)(Sl)92  + (2+2p),/(3+l)G-2p]2+4(2+1l)ep
Cancel  terms  on both  sides:
48p2 +  4p2 <  22  +  l2 + (0+2p)-/Ujl+l)9-2pl2+4(2+18)P  (All)
This Is  definitely  true  because:
(4p2 +  2  )2  < (0  + 2p) 2 2+  4p  2 (2+  40p 2 +  4p2)4p 2  42
92  + J32  +  (O+2p)V1((l+l)G-2p1 2+4(2+il)Op  )2.  (A12)
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